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FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM AMBASSADORS MEISSNER AND MEEHAN

E.O. 12865: GDS 11/4/87 (MEEHAN, FRANCIS J.) OR-M TAGS: EFIN, EGIN, RL SUBJECT: AID TO POLAND

1. ts - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. SUMMARY. IN OUR JUDGEMENT THE US GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO MAKE A DECISION BY MID-NOVEMBER WHETHER IT WILL COMMIT MAJOR NEW COMMERCIAL EXPORT CREDITS TO POLAND IN 1982, B.E. LEVELY SIMILAR TO THE 780 MILLION DOLLARS IN COMMER-CIAL AGRICULTURAL CREDITS EXTENDED LAST YEAR. THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND, WHY THE MID-NOVEMBER TIMING IS IMPORTANT, THE SIZE OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM AND SUGGESTS THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH CREDITS SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID TO POLAND, WHICH SHOULD BE CONTINUED WHETHER THERE IS A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE DECISION ON EXTENDING A LARGE VOLUME OF COMMERCIAL EXPORT CREDITS. SUCH FOOD AID IS A SHORT TERM EFFORT. LARGE VOLUME EXPORT CREDITS ARE A MEDIUM TERM FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO THE POLISH ECONOMY. SUCH A COMMITMENT. WHILE HAVING AN ECONOMIC-COMMERCIAL RATIONALE, IS IN ESSENCE A POLITICAL DECISION TO LEND US ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL CHANGES NOW TAKING PLACE IN POLAND. THE USG DOES NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST IN HELPING OUT COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS IN DISTRESS. THE AID WE RECOMMEND IS NOT TO HELP THE POLISH GOVERNMENT BUT TO MAXI-MIZE RUSSIAN LOSS AND U.S. GAIN IN THE POLISH SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

POLITICAL SITUATION

- 3. OVER THE LAST SIXTEEN MONTHS WE HAVE WITNESSED A NON-VIOLENT POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN POLAND. THIS REVOLUTION HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE MIDST OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS BROUGHT ON BY THE DISASTROUS REGIME ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE 1978'S AND AGGRAVATED BY THE EXTREMELY BAD 1988 HARVEST. THE VEHICLE FOR THE REVOLUTION HAS BEEN THE FORMATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS IN BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE. IN THIS CONTEXT, MANY ECONOMIC ISSUES ARE SIMULTAMEDUSLY KEY POLITICAL ISSUES --ECONOMIC DECENTRALIZATION, WAGE LEVELS, THE PRICE SYSTEM, COAL PRODUCTION, ETC.
- 4. INHERENT IN THESE ECONOMIC ISSUES, IN FACT, IS THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER IN POLAND. THE REGIME RESISTED FROM THE OUTSET THE RISE OF SOLIDARITY AND THE INTRODUCTION OF DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES IN SOCIETY. ONLY WIDESPREAD NATIONAL SUPPORT, ITS TRULY MASS BASIS, HAS ENABLED SOLIDARITY TO ACHIEVE THE STATUS OF A FREE DEMOCRATIC LABOR UNION. THE UNION HAS WON A VOICE IN THE RUNNING OF MON-MILITARY PLANTS; IT HAS ESTABLISHED ITS OWN PRESS; IT HAS SET THE PACE IN A PROCESS MOVING THE GOVERNMENT TOWARD ECONOMIC REFORMS THAT RELY HORE ON MARKET FORCES AND LESS ON CENTRAL PLANNING; IT MAS UPHELD THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE FARMERS TO HOLD AND USE LAND,

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AND WORKED SUCCESSFULLY FOR GOVERNMENT CONCESSIONS IN THIS CRUCIAL SECTOR.

- S. THESE GAINS HAVE NOT ALL BEEN CONSOLIDATED. SOLIDARITY KNOWS THAT THE GAINS WRUNG FROM PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS IN 1956 AND 1978 WERE ERODED AND FINALLY LOST. THIS TIME UNION 25X1 LEADERS ARE INSISTING ON STATUTORY CHANGES THAT WILL EMBED THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAST SIXTEEN MONTHS IN LAW. THEY WILL USE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON ECONOMIC REFORM TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT FAR-REACHING CHANGES IN POLAND'S COMMAND ECONOMI. THE PUBLIC MANIFESTATIONS OF THE POLITICAL POWER STRUGGLE ARE STRIKES AND STRIKE WARNING ACTIONS ON THE SOLIDARITY SIDE, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT CALLS FOR AN END TO STRIKES AND ACCUSES SOLIDARITY OF TRYING TO RUIN THE ECONOMY AS A WAY OF GAINING POLITICAL POWER.
- 6. THE STWTE STILL HOLDS A MONOPOLY ON BOTH POLICE POWER AND MILITARY POWER. THE MODERATE POLITICAL LEADERS NOW IN CHARGE HAVE RESISTED THE USE OF THIS POWER, BUT THEY WALK A THIM LINE. ON THE DOMESTIC SIDE THEY FACE THE CHALLENGE OF A MON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION REACHING FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER. EXTERNALLY, THERE ARE THE OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WHO SEE THE POLISH REVOLUTION AS A THREAT TO THEIR STABILITY. THESE GOVERNMENTS WANT TO SEE SOLIDARITY SUPPRESSED EITHER BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT OR, IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE, COMBINED WARSAW PACT FORCE. POLISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS ARE OFTEN PLAYED TO PLACATE THESE FORCES. THE MODERATE POLITICAL LEADERS NOW IN POWER IN POLAND ARE ATTEMPTING TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN POLISH HANDS. THEY HAVE A COMMON! INTEREST WITH SOLIDARITY IN KEEPING THE RUSSIANS OUT.
- 7. OVER THE PAST SIXTEEN MONTHS THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL CHANGES IN THE REGIME LEADERSHIP IN RESPONSE TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURE. RECENTLY THE COUNTRY'S LEADING MILITARY FIGURE, JARUZELSKI, HAS TAKEN OVER AS PARTY FIRST SECRETARY. HE SEEMS TO WISH TO CONTINUE THE MODERATE LINE OF NEGOTIATING SOLUTIONS WITH SOLIDARITY. WITH JARUZELSKI, HOWEVER, WE MAY BE AT THE END OF NATIONALLY KNOWN AND RESPECTED MODERATE LEADERSHIP.
 - 8. SOLIDARITY, LIKEWISE, HAS BEEN IN THE PROCESS OF RESOLV-ING ITS LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS. ITS RECENT CONGRESS REAFFIRMED WALESA AND PROVIDED HIM WITH A FIRMER BASE FOR MEGOTIATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT.
- 9. BECAUSE THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE POLISH EXPERIMENT IS A COMPLEX PROCESS INVOLVING A WEB OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, LEGISLA-LATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS, IT WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED OUICKLY. WE ANTICIPATE CYCLICAL PERIODS OF NEGOTIATION AND POLITICAL TENSION. OFTEN, BUT NOT ALWAYS, LEADING TO SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS. THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WILL BE THE CRUCIAL PERIOD FOR THE REGIME AND SOLIDARITY TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO COMPLETE A KIND OF MOEW SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMPACT WHICH WILL ESTABLISH AN ACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF SOCIAL HARMONY, RETURN LABOR TO INTENSIVE PRODUCTION AND GIVE POLAND THE CHANCE TO BEGIN REBUILDING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL STABILITY.

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FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM AMBASSADORS MEISSNER AND MEENAN

THE DECEMBER 18 CRISIS

18. OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE FOR ACHIEVING THE POLITICAL AGREEMENTS NECESSARY FOR STABILITY IS AN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT THAT
ENABLES THE SOLIDARITY LEADERSHIP TO CONTROL ITS MEMBERSHIP
AND RELIEVES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NEED TO USE WIDESPREAD
FORCE TO CONTROL CIVIL UNREST. SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT WILL NOT
BE EASY TO ACHIEVE GIVEN THE DILAPIDATED STATUS OF THE POLISH
ECONOMY. OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE WILL BE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FLOWS TO PURCHASE CRITICAL INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS, SPARE PARTS
AND FOOD FROM THE WEST. A GOOD POLISH HARVEST THIS YEAR HAS
ALLEVIATED SOMEWHAT THE NEED FOR FOOD IMPORTS BUT POLAND IS
DEPENDENT ON IMPORTED FEED GRAIN TO SUSTAIN LIVESTOCK AND
POULTRY PRODUCTION.

11. POLISH OFFICIALS OF THE FINANCE MINISTRY AND CENTRAL BANK TOLD THE TASK FORCE OF WESTERN CREDITOR GOVERNMENTS ON OCTOBER 29 THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PAY THE WESTERN PRIVATE BANKS THE 588 MILLION DOLLARS IN DUE OR DUE BUT UNPAID INTEREST FOR 1981. THIS SUM IS TO BE PAID TO THE BANKS ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER 18 AT THE SIGNING OF THE 1981 RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT WITH THE PRIVATE BANKS. THE BANKS HAVE ONLY AGREED TO RESCHEDULE PRINCIPAL AND NOT INTEREST. THE CREDITOR GOVERNMENTS TOLD THE POLES THAT THEY WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE POLES TO PAY THIS DEBT. RECENT EXPLORATIONS BY THE PRIVATE BANKS TO SEE IF THE USSR WOULD BORROW TO RELEND FUNDS TO POLAND TO REPAY THIS INTEREST DEBT HAVE ENDED IN FAILURE.

12. A MAJOR FINANCIAL CRISIS LOOMS FOR POLAND ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER 18. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IS THAT THE PRIVATE BANKS DECLARE A DEFAULT AND MOVE INTO COURTS TO SEIZE POLISH ECONOMIC ASSETS OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY (BANK ACCOUNTS, SHIPS, PLANES, ETC.). THE BEST SCENARIO IS THAT THE BANKS DO NOTHING BUT MUDDLE ALONG AS THEY ARE NOW DOING FOREGIVING PRINCIPAL PAYMENTS AND COLLECTING WHAT INTEREST THEY CAM. IN THIS LATTER CASE THERE COULD BE NO EXTENSION OF NEW CREDIT AND POLAND WOULD MOST LIKELY LOSE THE 3BB MILLION DOLLARS IN SHORT TERM CREDIT LINES IT STILL HAS OPEN. IT HAS LOST 78B MILLION DOLLARS OF SIMILAR LINES ALREADY THIS YEAR.

CONSEQUENCES AND REMEDIES

13. ANY OF THE ABOVE PRIVATE BANKING SCENARIOS PLAYS DIRECTLY TO SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN POLAND. THE SOVIETS FOR
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REASONS DO NOT WANT A COMPLÉTE COLLAPSE
OF THE POLISH ECONOMY. BUT A LOW LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
INCREASES THE PROBABILITY THAT THE MODERATES WILL FAIL AND
THAT HARD LINE POLITICIANS WILL REGAIN CONTROL OVER THE
REGIME. THE DISORDERS THAT WOULD PROBABLY ENCUE MIGHT LEAD
TO SOVIET INTERVENTION. BLEEDING POLAND OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
IT NEEDS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY CONTRIBUTES TO PRODUCING
AN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH SOVIET OBJECTIVES MIGHT
BE ACHIEVED.

14. U.S. DBJECTIVES -- THE EXISTENCE OF SOLIDARITY AS A FORCE FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, A MODERATE REGIME -- ARE BEST ACHIEVED AT HIGHER LEVELS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. PER CAPITA INCOME IN POLAND DROPPED 4 PERCENT IN 1988 AND WILL DROP 15 PERCENT IN 1981. A FURTHER DECLINE IN 1982 IS POSSIBLE. WE CAN EXPECT THAT AT SOME REDUCED LEVEL OF INCOME THERE COMES A POINT WHERE PEOPLE WILL ACCEPT A COMMAND SYSTEM THAT WILL AT LEAST SUSTAIN HIMIMAL LIVING STANDARDS. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD NOT BE FAVORABLE TO SOLIDARNOSC.

15. POLARC IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON PURCHASE FROM THE WEST.
TWO-THIRDS OF ITS INDUSTRY IS DEPENDENT ON SOME WESTERN PRODUCT IMPUTS. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, A SUBSTANTIAL DEPENDENCE
EXISTS IM AGRICULTURE. POLAND NEEDS APPROXIMATELY 1.5 BILLION
DOLLARS IM FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1981 TO PAY
DEBT SERVICE AND BUY CRITICAL WESTERN IMPORTS. THE 1932
FIGURE IS MEAR 2.5 BILLION DOLLARS. WE THEREFORE ARE LOOKING
AT A FIGURE OF SOME 4 BILLION DOLLARS OVER THE NEXT 15 MONTHS.

16. POLAMO'S NEEDS ARE SO LARGE THAT MEITHER BANKS NOR GOVERNMENT'S CAN CONSIDER PROVIDING THE NECESSARY CREDIT TO PLACE A FLOOR ON POLISH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. THERE MUST BE A CONCERTED ACTION BETWEEN BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND BANKS. OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT MOVE UNLESS THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO COMMIT FUNDS. THE BANKS WILL NOT EVEN CONSIDER INCREASING THEIR ECONOMIC EXPOSURE IN POLAND UNLESS THEY ARE ASSURED OF CONTINUED CREDITOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF POLAND AND A SOUND NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IS PUT IN PLACE.

17. THE B.S. DECISION IS THEREFORE PIVOTAL. IT MEEDS TO BE TAKEN BY MID-NOVEMBER, PRO OR CON. THE MID-NOVEMBER DEADLINE IS ONLY IMPORTANT IF THE DECISION IS POSITIVE. THERE MUST BE ENOUGH TIME FOR FINANCIAL DIPLOMACY TO FORESTALL THE DECEMBER 18 BARY CRISIS. THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK BUT IT CAN BE DONE IN THIRTY DAYS.

U.S. CONDITIONS FOR AID

18. ANY W.S. CONSIDERATION OF A LARGE VOLUME OF COMMERCIAL EXPORT CREDITS MUST TAKE THE FOLLOWING KEY FACTORS OR CONDITIONS IN MISS.

A. WE MUST BE INVOLVED IN A MULTILATERAL EFFORT THAT IS LARGE ENGINEE TO HAVE AN ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE FOLISH SITUATION.

B. ANY EFFORT HUST ALSO HAVE THE PARTICIPATION, FORMAL OF INFORMAL, OF THE PRIVATE BANKS. (IF THE BANKS ARE TAKING OUT HONEY, THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO PUT HONEY IN. THEY TOO HUST CONTRIBUTE.)

C. WE MEED ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED SOVIET AID AND ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COMMUNIST STATES. G SUCH ASSISTANCE IS NOT PRESENT NO REASONABLE AMOUNTS OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE WILL BE MEEPFUL.)

D. LACKING A COMPREHENSIVE POLISH ECONOMIC PROGRAM, ANY LARGE AMOUNTS OF EXPORT CREDITS SHOULD BE TRANCHED OVER THE NEXT FIFTEEN MONTHS. THIS WILL TAKE COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE BANKS.

E. CREDITS SHOULD BE TARGETED TO EXPORT INDUSTRIES OR IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PRODUCTION.

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FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM AMBASSADORS MZISSNER AND HEEHAN

- F. AGRICULTURAL CREDITS SHOULD BE TIED TO SPECIFIC CONDITIONALITY IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY. WE NEED TO WORK WITH CANADA AND THE EC ON THIS ISSUE.
- G. NEW COMMERCIAL CREDITS SHOULD BE EXTENDED FOR TEN YEARS TO RELIEVE THE POLES OF IMMEDIATE PAYMENT PROBLEMS WHICH THEY CANNOT MEET. (IF WE CAN ARRANGE INITIAL FIVE YEARS OF INTEREST PAYMENTS IN ZLOTYS FOR OUR OWN AID WE WILL HAVE A GREATER IMPACT.)
- H. WE MUST DEVELOP A PROGRAM INTERNAL TO POLAND TO USE EFFECTIVELY OUR ZLOTYS TO REINFORCE ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE COUNTRY -- SPECIFICALLY WE WOULD RECOMMEND PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT PRIVATE AGRICULTURE.
- I. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESCHEDULE OUR DEBT PAYMENTS WITH THE POLES OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS -- SIX MONTHS BY SIX MONTHS IF NECESSARY -- TO ALLOW CHANGES TO REESTABLISH ECONOMIC GROWTH AND BE REPAID IN THE FUTURE, AND J. WE SHOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO COMPARABILITY IN DEBT RESCHEDULING TO ASSURE REASONABLE BURDEN SHARING BETWEEN CREDITOR GROUPS.

RECOMMENDATION

- 13. WE BELIEVE THE ISSUE OF EXPORT CREDITS FOR FY 1982 SHOULD BE DECIDED BY MID-NOVEMBER. WE FACE A CONFLUENCE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES, AND WE MUST DECIDE WHETHER WE WISH TO INFLUENCE IT OR NOT. THIS IS A POLITICAL DECISION ON ECONOMIC LEVERAGE. WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE US SERIOUSLY CONSIDER SUCH AN EFFORT, END RECOMMENDATION.
- 28. THE ABOVE IS AN EMBASSY PARTIAL REWRITE OF A MESSAGE DRAFTED BY AMBASSADOR MEISSNER DURING HIS RECENT VISITS TO WARSAW. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE MY OWN ADDITIONS.
- 21. IN A MESSAGE WRITTEN LAST AUGUST (VARSAW 7948) I SUMMED UP MY VIEWS ON AID TO POLAND. I NOTED THAT SINCE ARRIVAL AT POST I HAD TENDED TO SHADE OFF ON THE CAUTIOUS SIDE ON LARGE-SCALE AID, WHILE SUPPORTING SPECIFIC LIMITED PROJECTS. I SAID IM EFFECT THAT THE ECONOMICS OF AID WERE DEBATABLE BUT THE POLITICS WERE CLEAR. MY CONCLUSION WAS THAT IT WAS WORTHWHILE FOR US TO PUT DOWN SUBSTANTIAL MONEY BECAUSE POLAND WAS THE BEST BET WE WERE LIKELY TO HAVE IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR A LONG TIME.
- 2. IT WILL BE CLEAR FROM THE JOINT RECOMMENDATION MADE WITH AMBASSADOR MEISSNER THAT I AM CONFIRMED IN MY PREVIOUS VIEW. A MAJOR FACTOR IN MY APPROACH NOW, HOWEVER, IS THAT I THINK THE POLISH POLITICAL CONTEXT IS MORE FAVORABLE THAT IT HAS BEEN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE POLISH EVENTS BEGAN IN THE SUMMER OF 1988. I DOUBT THAT BEFORE NOW THE POLES HAD SORTED THEMSELVES OUT SUFFICIENTLY TO BE ABLE TO MANDLE A COMPREMENSIVE AID OFFER EFFECTIVELY. NOW I THINK THERE IS A CHANCE

THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO REASONABLY SOON. IN OTHER WORDS, THE TIMING IS RIGHT NOW -- AND THE URGENCY IS CLEARLY GREAT.

- 23. THERE IS ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL TIMING FACTOR THAT IS WORTH CONSIDERING. WE ARE RIGHTLY CONCERNED ABOUT POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE ANXIOUS TO USE AGAINST OUR INTERESTS. BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC LATER THIS MORTH WILL ATTEMPT TO GIVE IMPETUS TO SUCH TRENDS AS PART OF A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AIMED AT SETTING US AND OUR ALLIE'S APART. THE WEAKNESS IN THIS OFFENSIVE IS POLAND. IT HIGHT BE ARGUED THAT THE RUSSIAN EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE IS AN ATTEMPT TO DIVERT FROM THE POLISH RELITIES. IF THIS IS SO, ACTION BY US ON POLAND MIGHT BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF A COUNTER-STRATEGY.
- 24. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR OR INTEREST IN BAILING OUT COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS IN DISTRESS. THE AID SCHEME ENVISAGED IN THIS MESSAGE FOR POLAND IS AIMED AT MAXIMIZING RUSSIAN LOSSES AND U.S. GAINS IN THE POLISH SITUATION. I RECOGNIZE THE FORCE OF THE-WORSE-THE-BETTER ANALYSIS. THE QUESTION IS WHAT REALLY MAKES IT WORSE FOR THE RUSSIAMS? MY CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT IS THAT CONTINUATION OF THE POLISH EXPERIMENT, WITHOUT INTERNAL CHAOS IN POLAND AND WITHOUT RUSSIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION, IS THE OPTION THAT REALLY PUTS MOSCOW ON THE RACK. THE LONGER THE EXPERIMENT GOES ON, THE BROADER THE RANGE OF DEMOCRATIC INNOVATION, THE MORE DIFFICULT THE OPTIONS WILL BECOME FOR THE RUSSIANS. IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE BOLDLY NOW IN THE AID FIELD. MEEHAN

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